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Matthews v. State, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 38 (July 09, 2020)1 
 
JUROR SELECTION: PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
 
Summary 
The Nevada Supreme Court considered whether the district court erred in denying the 
Appellant Matthews’ objection to the prosecution’s peremptory challenge in juror selection. The 
Court concluded that the district court erred for two reasons: the record refutes the State’s non-
demeanor explanations for using a peremptory challenge, which indicates that the explanations 
were pretextual, and because the district court did not fully explain its reasoning as is required in 
objections raised against a peremptory challenge. 
 
Background 
This case is an appeal from a conviction based on a jury verdict of three counts of 
attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon and two counts of robbery with the use of a 
deadly weapon, among other charges. The issue presented in this case arose out of problems 
during the jury selection process. During jury selection, the prosecution used one of its 
peremptory challenges to remove prospective Juror No. 342, an African American woman from 
the jury pool after interviewing her. Matthews’ counsel made a Batson objection, claiming that 
the peremptory challenge was based on Juror 342’s race.2 
The State argued that Juror 342 was excluded because she gave very tenuous responses 
when asked about being fair and impartial on the jury. Specifically, the prosecutors mentioned 
that Juror 342 hesitated and rolled her eyes multiple times during questioning, particularly in 
response to questions on fairness and impartiality. They were also concerned about her views 
regarding the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.  
 Matthews’ counsel countered that a lot of prospective jury members exhibited similar 
demeanor – rolling their eyes, looking down, or nodding in agreement or disagreement. In 
response, the State argued that Juror’s 342’s demeanor was more concerning for several reasons. 
When asked about fairness and impartiality, she sighed and said “no” which implied hesitation 
on her part. Ultimately, the State did not want Juror 342 because they did not want someone who 
hesitated when asked if they will be fair. 
At issue before the Court is the fact that the district court summarily overruled Matthews' 
objection, without making any specific findings or explaining its reasoning.  
 
Discussion 
Using a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror based on race violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.3 When an opposing counsel objects to 
the other party’s peremptory challenge, courts use a three-step framework established by 
Batson.4 First, the opponent of the peremptory challenge makes a prima facie showing that the 
challenge was based on race.5 Second, if the prima facie showing is made, the proponent presents 
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a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge.6 The first two steps are not at issue here 
because the State gave a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge before Matthews 
made a prima facie showing of discrimination. 
At issue here is the district court’s actions at step three. After the district court hears 
arguments from both sides, it determines whether the opponent has proven purposeful 
discrimination.7 A "district court must undertake a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and 
direct evidence of intent as may be available and consider all relevant circumstances before 
ruling on a Batson objection and dismissing the challenged juror.8" However, the Court notes 
that it repeatedly asked the district courts to clearly spell out their reasoning and determinations 
in ruling on a Batson objection because their determinations frequently hinge on the demeanor of 
the prosecutor exercising the strike, and the demeanor of the juror being struck, both of which 
can only be witnessed by the district court judge. Here, the district court failed to give any 
reasoning for overruling Matthews’ objection.  
In cases where the district court fails to give adequate reasoning, the Court examines the 
record to determine whether the State’s peremptory challenge of Juror 342 was more likely than 
not motivated by race. Examination of the record is a tool of last resort for the court because 
generally, the cold record is a poor substitute for demeanor observation since it cannot show 
physical cues and responses. When the State gives both a demeanor and a non-demeanor 
explanation for the preemptory challenge, and the district court does not make a factual finding 
as to the juror's demeanor, the Court must focus on the States non-demeanor explanations for the 
peremptory challenge in determining whether Matthews demonstrated purposeful discrimination. 
However, when a race-neutral explanation is belied, or refuted, by the record, then it is 
evidence of purposeful discrimination. Here, the record shows that Juror 342 answered "[n]o" to 
the district court's general question asking if there was any reason she could not be fair and 
impartial. The district court also asked if anything from Juror 342’s previous experiences—her 
serving as a juror in a civil trial or her father's murder—would affect her ability to be fair and 
impartial, and she also responded “[n]o." Regarding fairness, Juror 342’s response was also 
standard; in response to a question regarding if her experiences would make her a good juror, she 
said, "Well, I know I’ll be fair. I’ll be fair to all the information I receive." Finally, the defense 
counsel asked Juror 342 if she would want herself as a juror if she were a defendant, and she 
responded “[y]es.” Therefore, nothing in the record suggests that Juror 342’s responses were 
tenuous as the State claimed. 
The State also claimed that Juror 342 answered questions about her ability to be fair and 
impartial less forcefully than other prospective jurors. However, her response was a simple “no,” 
which is identical to the responses given by other prospective jurors. Juror 342’s responses 
regarding the criminal justice system – she thought the system was pretty fair, not perfect when 
pressed by the prosecutor – were likewise similar to other prospective jurors. Others stated that 
they thought the system was “pretty fair” and another explicitly said that they thought minorities 
have it a lot worse than white people when it comes to sentencing. Therefore, the record refutes 
the State’s non-demeanor explanations for using a peremptory challenge on Juror 342, indicating 
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Conclusion 
The Court concluded that the district court erred in denying Matthews’ Batson objection 
because it did not fully engage in sensitive inquiry and consideration, which is a required step 
under the Batson analysis. The record also supports the finding that the State’s reasons for 
excluding Juror 342 were mere pretext for excluding her based on race. The Court reversed the 
judgment of conviction based on structural error and remanded this matter for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
